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Introduction
On 25 November 2016, Fidel Castro died. He was the last surviving elite participant in the 1962
nuclear crisis, widely regarded as the closest humanity ever came to nuclear war. With his passing we
have lost a direct link with the experience of very intense fear of imminent nuclear war, and with the
learning of the crucial role of luck in preserving the world from nuclear devastation. From now on,
our interpretation of the danger of the most dangerous crisis in the history of the nuclear age is
radically detached from direct experience at the highest levels of decision-making.
At the same time, all nuclear weapons states are developing vast programmes to enhance their
nuclear weapons capabilities, tensions between Russia and the West remain high, and the current US
president is suspected by some to be more prone to using nuclear weapons in anger than any of his
predecessors.1 In such a context, this article offers a broader investigation of our beliefs about the
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1 Ten former nuclear launch ofﬁcers wrote an open letter to The Washington Post prior to the election explaining
that: ‘The pressures the system places on that one person are staggering and require enormous composure,
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ability to control nuclear weapons and manage nuclear crises based on a study of the so-called
‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ (hereafter referred to as the Crisis).
This crisis, which today is widely considered to be the closest mankind has ever come to nuclear war,
is an essential case study for assessing the fear-inducing effects of nuclear weapons and under-
standing the possibility of nuclear learning.2
‘Learning’ in this context means learning from history, and it assumes that the interpretation of key
events in the nuclear age plays a decisive role in the behaviour of policymakers in crisis situations.3
My understanding of learning is based on the three following premises. First, I accept the assumption
that national experience is a major source of learning.4 Second, I accept the ﬁnding of the literature
portraying overconﬁdence as a source of increased risks.5 Third, I assume that shared international
learning about the limits of controllability of nuclear weapons is an important precondition for more
informed nuclear decision-making and public deliberations on the subject.6 As a consequence of
these three premises, I regard the absence of learning, or forms of memory that systematically deny
the role of luck and promote overconﬁdence, as contributing to nuclear danger.7 The fact that
learning is rare does not make its absence any less problematic or puzzling.
The core puzzle of this article is the following: the latest assessment of the Crisis emphasises the
underestimation of the danger at the time, the limits of control over nuclear weapons, and the role of
luck in the peaceful outcome of the Crisis. However, not all policy and scholarly communities have
judgment, restraint and diplomatic skill. Donald Trump does not have these leadership qualities.’ Available at:
{https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3141707/Read-the-letter-from-former-nuclear-launch.pdf} accessed
26 November 2016; Bruce Blair, ‘Trump and the nuclear keys’, New York Times (12 October 2016), available
at: {http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/opinion/trump-and-the-nuclear-keys.html?_r=1}.
2 Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: a nuclear order of battle, October and
November 1962’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68:6 (2012), p. 2, Don Munton, ‘Hits and myths: the
essence, the puzzles and the Missile Crisis’, International Relations, 26:3 (2012), p. 305; Jean-Yves Haine, Les
Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d’alliés? (Paris: Payot, 2004), p. 203; James Hershberg, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in
Melvyn Lefﬂer and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and
Détente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 65. Paul Nitze considered the Berlin crisis as even
more dangerous and Ray S. Cline is one of those in the US who maintains that the danger of the Cuban missile
crisis was overestimated and, overall, quite minimal. Both of those judgements were formulated before the key
discoveries of the 1990s reviewed in Section 1. Ray S. Cline, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, Foreign Affairs,
68:4 (1989). Thanks to Leopoldo Nuti for directing me to this article.
3 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The
Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1988); Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 6.
4 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, ch. 6.
5 Dominic Johnson links overconﬁdence to the breakout of war in Overconﬁdence and War: The Havoc and
Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). In the realm of computer safety,
Donald McKenzie showed that: ‘The safer a system is believed to be, the more catastrophic the accidents to
which it is subject.’ Donald McKenzie, ‘Computer-related accidental death: an empirical exploration’, Science
and Public Policy, 24:1 (1994), p. 246. This notion has been applied to nuclear weapons by Eric Schlosser in
Command and Control (New York: Allen Lane, 2013), p. 313.
6 Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘The concept of nuclear learning’, Nonproliferation Review, 19:1 (2012), p. 81 and ‘The
importance of international learning’, Review of International Studies, 29:2 (2003).
7 Pioneering work here would include Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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taken these insights seriously. The unbearable lightness of luck seems constantly to escape the learning
process.8 This article explores three reasons for this failure to learn, focusing on ideational factors. I do
not deny the role of institutional and bureaucratic dynamics in the entrenchment of representations
related to nuclear weapons, which will be explored in a subsequent essay, but I do not analyse them
here. Staying at the level of ideas emphasises the responsibility of scholars and analysts to work in the
name of avoiding overconﬁdence without waiting for structural or institutional change.9
Forms of learning that promote overconﬁdence have been documented across national cases. In India
and Pakistan, as Russel Leng and S. Paul Kapur have noted: ‘the learning that has occurred has been
largely dysfunctional and dangerously hawkish’.10 In the US, Pulitzer Prize winner and longtime
analyst of US nuclear weapons policy Richard Rhodes similarly observed: ‘despite several close calls,
… no one in authority believes the damned things will go off, and so everyone wants to play with
them, like treasure hunters wallowing in a vault of golden coins laced with guardian scorpions, like
children discovering the loaded gun their parents thoughtlessly neglected to lock away.’11 By contrast
with the US and the UK, the other two nuclear-armed NATO states, France has received relatively
little attention. Drawing on unexploited primary sources to illuminate this less-known case, the
following article identiﬁes and explains the limits to French nuclear learning.
In this context, France is a relevant case for two reasons. First, as Beatrice Heuser eloquently showed:
‘while nuclear weapons also have a metaphysical dimension for other nuclear powers, it is most
developed in France’.12 France displays in particularly acute form some of the sources of overconﬁdence
in the controllability of nuclear crises that can been found in other nuclear armed states. If ofﬁcial
representatives of all nuclear weapons states tend to portray themselves as responsible custodians of their
nuclear arsenals, the French stand out for their public display of conﬁdence in the perfect safety record of
their nuclear arsenal. On 1 May 2015, French Ambassador Jean-Yves Simon-Michel stated before the
Main Committee I of the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference that: ‘There is no risk of
the [French nuclear] weapons being used non-intentionally.’ Two weeks before, he had given a tour of
the Luxeuil Air Force base and its former weapons storage facilities. He added that the visitors ‘will have
seen [this] for themselves’.13 This article treats such public conﬁdence in control over nuclear weapons as
part of a puzzle, and analyses how such a statement has become possible and acceptable. Second, there is
only very limited scholarship on the French experience and memory of the Crisis. In terms of historio-
graphy, most of the scholarship on the Crisis still tells the story of a bipolar confrontation and ignores
the perspective and agency of actors other than the US and USSR, Cuba included.14
8 Daniel Kahneman describes how heuristic biases lead us to overconﬁdence as denial of the role of luck in
Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Penguin, 2011), part III.
9 On the responsibility of scholars focusing on nuclear weapons issues, see Benoît Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons
scholarship as a case of self-censorship in security studies’, Journal of Global Security Studies, 1:4 (2016),
pp. 326–36.
10 S. Paul Kapur, ‘Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities and nuclear instability: Why nuclear South
Asia is not like Cold War Europe’, in Scott Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009), p. 202, quoting Russell Leng in part.
11 Richard Rhodes, ‘Absolute power’, New York Times Sunday Book Review (21 March 2014).
12 Beatrice Heuser,Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Palgrave,
1998), p. 75.
13 Jean-Yves Simon-Michel, statement at the Main Committee I, 2015 NPT Review conference, available at:
{http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/1May_
France.pdf} accessed 16 May 2016, pp. 3–4.
14 This literature is too abundant to quote here. James Hershberg distinguishes three waves in the scholarship on
the Crisis and sees the emergence of a body of work trying to analyse it as a global event. The ﬁrst wave
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What limited literature does exist on France is not available in English and ignores most of the
primary and secondary sources analysed in this article: recently published memoirs, declassiﬁed
archival material, testimonies of former policymakers and high-level military personnel, representations
of the Crisis in the French media, specialised military and intellectual publications, and high
school textbooks.15 Overall, little has been written on the memory of key episodes in the nuclear
age in France and their impact on French thinking about nuclear safety, security and possible nuclear
futures.16
In addressing the puzzle of how the discoveries about the role of luck in the outcome of the Crisis, never
adequately refuted, have not been integrated in the accepted body of knowledge about nuclear history
and policy, this article makes three contributions. First, the focus on new French primary sources is
relevant to security studies as well as policymaking circles given frequent misconceptions about nuclear
dynamics. Nuclear security studies scholars too often make unwarranted theory-driven extrapolations
based on few or no primary sources, and latent assumptions about a common narrative of the danger,
causes and consequences of the ‘most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age’ are widespread in Western
nuclear policy circles.17 Second, and consequently, the article tackles a widespread assumption of
automaticity linking the presence of nuclear weapons to a fear-induced deterrent effect. Vipin Narang
labelled this as ‘an existential bias’ in the literature on deterrence, focused on the acquisition of nuclear
weapons as the only meaningful threshold, a bias that Daniel Deudney locates in the tradition of
focused on the US and a second one including a Soviet and Cuban perspective. Christian Ostermann and
James Hershberg (eds), ‘The global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: New evidence from behind the Iron, Bamboo,
and Sugarcane Curtains, and beyond’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 17/18 (2012), p. 7.
One of the efforts from the ‘third wave’ is Renata Keller’s ‘Latin American Cuban Missile Crisis’, Diplomatic
History, 39:2 (2015). However, publications around the 50th anniversary of the Crisis show that the ‘ﬁrst
wave’ remains hegemonic. Sheldon Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths and Realities
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); David Coleman, The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of
the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012); and David Gibson, Talk at the Brink: Deliberation
and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). Exceptions and
early calls for going beyond the ﬁrst two waves are Jutta Weldes and Mark Laffey, ‘Decolonizing the Cuban
Missile Crisis’, International Studies Quarterly, 52:3 (2008).
15 Publications in French not taken into account by the existing scholarship on the Crisis in English include: Alain
Joxe, ‘La crise de Cuba: entraînement contrôlé vers la dissuasion réciproque’, Stratégie, 1 (summer 1964);
Alain Joxe, Socialisme et crise nucléaire (Paris: L’Herne, 1973); Claude Delmas, Cuba: De la révolution à la
crise des fusées (Brussels: Complexe, 2006 [orig. pub. 1982]), pp. 119–64; Gabriel Robin, La crise de Cuba:
Du mythe à l’histoire (Paris: IFRI/Economica, 1984); Manuela Semidei, Kennedy et la révolution cubaine: Un
apprentissage politique? (Paris: Julliard, 1972); Vincent Touze,Missiles et décisions: Kennedy, Khrouchtchev et
Castro et la crise de Cuba d’octobre 1962 (Paris: André Versailles, 2012); Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la
crise des missiles de Cuba (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993); Maurice Vaïsse, ‘France et la crise de Cuba’, Histoire,
Economie et Société, 13:1 (1994). In 2006, an entry on the Crisis in Claire Andrieu, Philippe Braud and
Guillaume Piketty (eds), Dictionnaire de Gaulle (Paris: Bouquins, 2006).
16 This is compatible with the fruitful agenda of memory studies, both in IR and international history. See Patrick
Finney, ‘The ubiquitous presence of the past? Collective memory and international history’, The International
History Review, 36:3 (2014). For the connection between interpretations of the past and expectations of
possible futures, see Benoît Pelopidas, ‘The oracles of proliferation’, Nonproliferation Review, 18:1 (2011),
pp. 300–1, 308–9 and Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons scholarship’.
17 On the former, see Vipin Narang, ‘The Use and Abuse of Large-n Methods in Nuclear Studies’, Forum
H-Diplo/ISSF 2 (2014), available at: {http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf} accessed 16 May 2016
and Benoît Pelopidas, ‘Renunciation: Reversal and rollback’, in Joseph Pilat and Nathan Busch (eds),
Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy (London: Routledge, 2015).
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‘automatic deterrence statism’ in the literature on nuclear weapons policy.18 Indeed, this assumption
crosses the policy divide over the desirability of nuclear disarmament. On the anti-disarmament side,
SusanMartin recently summarised the issue in the following terms: ‘nuclear weapons cannot be stripped
of their values as a strategic deterrent’ since ‘[their] strategic deterrent capability … stems from their
material characteristics’.19 As James Lebovic aptly summarises, in this tradition, the deterrent effect does
not come from rational calculation but from fear: ‘the existential deterrent acquires its power from the
non rational world of fear’.20 On the pro-disarmament side, proponents of ‘virtual nuclear deterrence’
or ‘weaponless deterrence’ have to subscribe to an even more radical version of this idea for their
concept to make sense. In their case, the weapons do not even need to be assembled in order to deter,
their existence and the fear that they trigger need only exist in the mind of the deterred.21 In other
words, whether it is for deterrence or disarmament, the mere presence of nuclear weapons (physical or
virtual) is expected to inspire fear on account of their destructive capacity; such a dynamic, if granted,
would clearly constrain the scope for re-evaluation of these weapons. In other words, the value of
nuclear weapons would be irreducibly determined by the physics of nuclear devastation and unaffected
by social and political factors. Given the position of France in the middle of the expected European
battleﬁeld for the coming nuclear war of the 1960s, if it turns out that the French experience and
memory of the Crisis were largely unmarked by fear, this widely-held assumption of the automaticity of
the effect of the presence of nuclear weapons will be opened to further challenge. As a consequence, the
valuation of nuclear weapons will be reassessed as a socially and historically constructed process,
irreducible to destructive capacity alone.22 Third, empirically, this study of the French case responds to
Nick Ritchie’s invitation to study ‘regimes of value’ of nuclear weapons beyond his foundational case
study of the UK.23 It also contributes to a growing literature on nuclear fear and atomic anxiety that has
not documented the French experience in detail or consulted French-language primary sources.24
The rest of this article is divided in ﬁve parts. I ﬁrst review the most recent literature on the Crisis,
with evidence showing that the situation was indeed extremely dangerous and that its peaceful
outcome cannot be reduced to successful, fully informed crisis-management. Nuclear weapons use
was avoided in the autumn of 1962 not through restraint on the part of President Kennedy and the
Soviet leadership only, but as a result of decisions made by individual nuclear operators, under
conditions of incomplete or incorrect information. I then identify three reasons for why this inter-
pretation, strengthened over the past three decades and never persuasively refuted, has still not been
fully incorporated in scholarship and public discourse: rhetorical practices of epistemic and practical
inconsistencies that acknowledge the role of luck but do not treat it adequately and bring it back
18 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conﬂict (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 3; Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from
the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 246.
19 Susan Martin, ‘The continuing value of nuclear weapons: a structural realist analysis’, Contemporary Security
Policy, 34:1 (2013), pp. 188, 174.
20 James Lebovic, Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in US Nuclear Strategy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1990), p. 193.
21 Contemporary proponents of virtual nuclear deterrence include Sidney Drell and Raymond Jeanloz, ‘Nuclear
deterrence in a world without deterrence’, in George Shultz, Sidney Drell, James Goodby (eds), Deterrence: Its
Past and its Future (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2011). Pioneering works are Michael Mazarr, ‘Virtual
nuclear arsenals’, Survival, 37:3 (1995) and Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984).
22 Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and devaluing nuclear weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy, 34:1 (2013).
23 Ibid., p. 166.
24 Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012); Frank Sauer, Atomic
Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
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within the realm of controllability; a disciplinary rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate
scholarly practice and the memory of an idiosyncratic experience of the Crisis exempt of fear.
It is historically inaccurate and politically unwise, I argue, to expect that analysts’ post-facto con-
ﬁrmation of the danger confronted at the time will entail a corresponding learning process on the
part of policymakers and the public, and I conclude by outlining the implications of this point for the
scholarship in history and security studies.
The latest assessment of the possibility of nuclear use during the Cuban
Missile Crisis
Even though discussion over the dangers of the Crisis continues, scholarship from the last three
decades has reached compelling conclusions about the role of luck in its outcome, contingent on
limited information, misperceptions, the limits of safety and presidential command and control over
nuclear weapons, as well as the potential of accidents. As a 2015 literature review concluded, ‘had
everyone stopped researching … the crisis in the 1980s our awareness of the risks of nuclear war
would be greatly diminished. If we had chosen to draw the lessons on the basis of our knowledge, we
would almost certainly have drawn the wrong lessons.’25
First, the limits of political leaders’ knowledge about nuclear weapons during the Crisis have been
exposed. For example, the Kennedy administration massively underestimated the number of Soviet
troops in Cuba, ignored that they arguably could ﬁre tactical weapons based in Cuba, and that
Castro was actively pushing the Soviets to be more aggressive.26 Excomm members, we now know,
were not informed when the head of Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Thomas Power, took
the unprecedented decision to place American nuclear forces on Defense Condition 2. One of those
missiles was even launched for a test ﬂight from Vandenberg Air Force base, in California, on 26
October 1962 at 4 am, as planned before the Crisis, without the president knowing about it.27
Second, and consequently, command and control problems also have to be taken into account, so
that complete presidential control cannot be taken for granted. As Scott Sagan wrote twenty years
ago, in a classic account:
Many serious safety problems, which could have resulted in an accidental or unauthorized
detonation or a serious provocation to the Soviet government, occurred during the crisis. None
of these incidents led to inadvertent escalation or an accidental war. All of them, however, had
the potential to do so. President Kennedy may well have been prudent. He did not, however,
have unchallenged ﬁnal control over U.S. nuclear weapons.28
25 Len Scott, ‘The only thing to look forward to’s the past’, in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, The Cuban
Missile Crisis: Critical Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 225.
26 On the evening of 27 October 1962, Castro thought that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent. Therefore, he
sent a cable to Khrushchev asking for a Soviet nuclear strike if the United States attacked Cuba. James G. Blight
and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill
& Wang, 1989), p. 109; Raymond Garthoff, Reﬂections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1989), p. 62; Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, with Anna Melyakova
(eds), ‘New Evidence on Tactical Nuclear Weapons – 59 Days in Cuba’, National Security Archive Electronic
Brieﬁng Book (11 December 2013), available at: {http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/} accessed
23 May 2016.
27 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), pp. 79–80.
28 Ibid., p. 116.
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For example, during the night of 26–7 October 1962, at the height of the Crisis, an American U-2
strayed into Soviet air space over the Arctic. Soviet ﬁghter jets scrambled to intercept the U-2 while
F-102 interceptors were sent to escort it home and prevent the Soviet MIGs from freely entering US
airspace. Given the circumstances, the F-102s’ conventional air-to-air missiles had been replaced
with nuclear-tipped ones and their pilots could decide to use nuclear weapons: ‘the interceptors at
Galena were armed with the nuclear Falcon air-to-air missiles and, under existing safety rules, were
authorized to carry the weapons in full readiness condition in any “active air defense” mission.’29
Fortunately, the spy plane turned back and the Soviet jets held their ﬁre.30 On the Soviet side, a
similar problem of the delegation of the authority to use nuclear weapons occurred.31 Moreover, it is
now well established that President Kennedy was often in a minority in opposing military action
against Cuba during the 13 days of the Crisis (to follow the American periodisation).32 A usual
interpretation of the Crisis assuming complete control from the two leaders might ﬁnd this com-
forting: his ability to resist Excomm pressure shows that he would never have used force, let alone
nuclear weapons, during the Crisis.33 However, ﬁnding conﬁdence in the president’s consistency is in
itself problematic. It neglects, for instance, Kennedy’s severe illness, dependence on steroids, and
reliance on competing medical opinions and treatments from doctors with whom he did not share
what the others were prescribing him, which might have affected his judgement.34
Third, the most recent research shows that weapons safety was very rudimentary at the time. For
instance, in the early 1960s NATO weapon handlers pulled the arming wires out of a Mark 7
nuclear warhead while they were unloading it from a plane. ‘When the wires were pulled, the arming
sequence began – and if the X-Unit charged, a Mark 7 could be detonated by its radar, by its
barometric switches, by its timer or by falling just a few feet from a plane and landing on
29 Ibid., p. 137.
30 Ibid., pp. 135–8.
31 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War
(New York: Knopf, 2008), pp. 303ff.
32 Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory.
33 Ibid., pp. 157, 163.
34 Rose McDermott, ‘The politics of presidential medical care: the case of John F. Kennedy’, Politics and Life
Sciences, 33:2 (2014), p. 85 and Rose McDermott, Presidential Leadership, Illness and Decision Making
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 118–56. I am aware of the literature suggesting that
Kennedy’s treatment did not affect his judgement; see Robert Gilbert, The Mortal Presidency: Illness and
Anguish in the White House (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998); Bert Park, Ailing, Aging, Addicted:
Studies in Compromised Leadership (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993); and Robert Dallek, John
F. Kennedy: An Unﬁnished Life 1917–1963 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2003). However, these
ﬁndings are contradicted by some of Kennedy’s own commentary and his brother’s (see McDermott,
Presidential Leadership). Whether or not Kennedy’s judgement was actually impaired or not, the point remains
that betting on the consistency of a man who relies on large quantities of medication with potential psycho-
tropic side effects and on competing treatments by doctors who do not know what the other treatments are is a
very risky bet. Dr Eugene Cohen, Kennedy’s long-term endocrinologist, warned JFK against the dubious
practices of one of his doctors, Dr Jacobson, nicknamed Dr Feelgood, who would in 1975 be denied his
authorisation to practice medicine, as early as November 1961. He wrote: ‘You cannot be permitted to receive
therapy from irresponsible doctors like M.J. who by forms of stimulating injections offer some temporary help
to neurotic or mentally ill individuals… this therapy conditions one’s needs almost like a narcotic, [and] is not
for responsible individuals who at any split second may have to decide the fate of the universe.’ Quoted in
Laurence Leamer, ‘A Kennedy historian assesses the Dallek disclosures’, Boston Globe (2 November 2002).
Luckily, Dr Jacobson, who gave amphetamines to the president, stopped visiting the White House before the
Cuban Missile Crisis, according to Rose McDermott and based on George Buckley record of the injections the
President received in 1962–3. See McDermott, Presidential Leadership, p. 120.
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a runway.’35 In Italy, a few months before the Crisis, Jupiter missiles were hit by lightning four times,
‘some of their thermal batteries ﬁred, and in two of the warheads, tritium gas was released into their
cores’ and may have boosted a nuclear detonation.36 One of the missiles rolled down a hill.37 So,
beyond the command and control problem outlined above, the safety of the weapons was very
problematic at the time and accidental detonation of NATO weapons could have happened during
the Crisis.
Fourth, those possibilities of accidents and miscalculations could have increased the danger of the
Crisis in an indirect fashion, by degrading the common knowledge of the unacceptability of nuclear
war that arguably kept the two leaders away from the brink: they could have led one of the two to
think that nuclear war was imminent. As a result, one can reasonably claim that the danger of war was
higher than leaders thought at the time.38 In 2015, Len Scott reviewed the latest developments in the
scholarship about the Crisis on this point and concluded: ‘the emphasis on contingency and unac-
knowledged risk has accelerated with more evidence. Better understanding of the role of
misperceptions, miscalculations and mistakes… suggests that the risk of nuclear war was greater than
thought by decision-makers at the time and by commentators subsequently.’39 Similarly, Réachbha
FitzGerald concluded a 2007 review of the literature with the idea that: ‘recent research into the
operational aspects of the crisis has revealed that both the US and the Soviet leaderships had less
knowledge and control over their military than they or anybody else realized.’40 The consensus even
goes beyond the literature in English and extends to the award-winning 2014 volume in Italian by
Leonardo Campus, I Sei Giorni Che Sconvolsero Il Mondo (The Six Days that Shook the World).41
Taken together, all those elements about the limits of controllability and predictability of the Crisis
point to a role played by luck in its outcome. In 1994, Len Scott and Steve Smith already observed,
there is now ample evidence that the fact that the crisis did not lead to nuclear war was due, in
large part, to good luck. In our view this is a most important ﬁnding since it undermines the
claims of those who think that nuclear crises can be safely managed and that command and
control systems will work as they are meant to work.42
Dean Acheson proposed this interpretation as early as 1969. He attributed the outcome of the
Crisis to ‘plain dumb luck’, and other key participants would come to share this view after a handful
of oral history conferences conducted by James Blight and his colleagues.43 Among them were
35 Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 261, based on interviews with weapon designer Harold Agnew.
36 Ibid., p. 329.
37 Deborah Sorrenti, L’Italia nella Guerra fredda: La storia dei missili Jupiter 1957–1963 (Roma: Edizioni
Associate, 2003), pp. 63, 79. For UK examples, see Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 262.
38 David Holloway, ‘Pathways to nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union in October 1962’, in Benoît
Pelopidas (ed.), Global Nuclear Vulnerability: 1962 as the Inaugural Crisis? (book manuscript under review).
39 Scott, ‘The only thing to look forward to’s the past’, pp. 241–2.
40 Réachbha FitzGerald, ‘Historians and the Cuban Missile Crisis: the evidence-interpretation relationship as seen
through differing interpretations of the Crisis settlement’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 18 (2007), p. 202.
41 Leonardo Campus, I Sei Giorni che sconvolsero il mondo: La crisi dei missile di Cuba i le sue percezioni
internazionali (Florence: Le Monnier, 2014), pp. 123–40. The book won the 2015 Fruili Storia award.
42 Len Scott and Steve Smith, ‘Lessons of October: Historians, political scientists, policy-makers and the Cuban
Missile Crisis’, International Affairs, 70:4 (1994), p. 683. At the end of the 1990s, while reviewing works published
during this decade, Melvyn Lefﬂer concluded similarly that they: ‘highlight contingency and inadvertence’. Melvyn
Laffer, ‘What do we “now know” ?’, The American History Review, 104:2 (1999), p. 501.
43 Dean Acheson, ‘Dean Acheson’s version of Robert Kennedy’s version of the Cuban missile affair’, Esquire
(February 1969), p. 76; for McNamara, see Eroll Morris, The Fog of War (Columbia Tristar, 2003); for
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former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Nikolai S. Leonov, KGB head of Cuban
Affairs at the time. This view is now supported by the scholarly evidence presented above and explicitly
endorsed by Scott Sagan, who writes that: ‘there was an element of good luck involved in avoiding
accidental war in October 1962’.44 This cannot be reduced to good management. Twenty years later,
Campbell Craig raises important objections against Sagan’s work, but still fundamentally agrees with
this point.45
In a nutshell, then, even if one cannot know for sure what would have followed the ﬁrst nuclear
strike, the scholarship of the last three decades shows that the Crisis was much more dangerous than
leaders thought at the time. Problems of limited or false information, misperceptions, limits of safety
and presidential command and control over nuclear weapons as well as accidents susceptible to
create the impression that war was imminent, could all have led to inadvertent escalation.
A narrative of control cannot fully account for the peaceful outcome of the Crisis and the part played
by luck.
Reasserting control by practical and epistemic inconsistencies
After those discoveries, the few voices who still want to argue that the dangers of the Crisis were
manageable can only do so via an inconsistency: they at ﬁrst claim to acknowledge the limits of
safety and controllability of nuclear weapons and the unpredictability of all pathways to nuclear
war, but they then either reduce the realm of what was possible to what is measurable, or reintroduce
the idea of manageability as the inevitable outcome of policy-relevant research. In the ﬁrst case,
which I characterise as an epistemic inconsistency, the risk frame makes it impossible to account for
the limits of control and safety identiﬁed above or for the role of luck, in particular if luck is deﬁned
as an effect of unquantiﬁable uncertainty.46 In the second case, which I characterise as a practical
inconsistency, the role of luck and the limits of controllability will be denied in practice so that
acknowledging them will not lead to a questioning of managerialism as an approach of nuclear crises
on epistemological, ethical, or political grounds.47
John Lewis Gaddis is perhaps the most explicit practitioner of the epistemic inconsistency view in
English-language literature. He writes:
Just how close [we came to nuclear war], though, remains at issue.… The tendency afterwards
was to lower the odds. Hawks found it inconceivable that Khrushchev would have used
nuclear weapons to defend Cuba in the face of such overwhelming American superiority.
Leonov, see Thomas S. Blanton and James G. Blight, ‘A conversation in Havana’, Arms Control Today,
32:9 (2002), p. 7.
44 Sagan, The Limits of Safety, p. 154; also p. 155.
45 Campbell Craig, ‘Testing Organisation Man: the Cuban Missile Crisis and The Limits of Safety’, International
Relations, 26:3 (2012), p. 293; also Campbell Craig, ‘Reform or revolution: Scott Sagan’s Limits of Safety and
its contemporary implications’, in Scott and Hughes, The Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 104.
46 On the difﬁculties of some of this scholarship to properly account for luck, see Benoît Pelopidas, ‘We all lost
the Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Scott and Hughes, The Cuban Missile Crisis, pp. 173ff and ‘The book that leaves
nothing to chance’, unpublished manuscript.
47 Patrick Porter’s excellent essay on ‘Taking uncertainty seriously’ shows good examples of this inconsistency
between the theoretical acknowledgement of limits of knowledge of the future and planning practices which
still assume the possibility of such knowledge. Patrick Porter, ‘Taking uncertainty seriously: Classical realism
and national security’, European Journal of International Security, 1:2 (2016).
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Doves insisted that whatever the numerical balance Kennedy would never have authorized an
invasion of the island. … Calculating risks retrospectively is almost as difﬁcult as trying to
anticipate them: in any complex system so many things can go wrong that it is difﬁcult to
know what might – or might not have. A reasonable place to start, though, is with those in
command.48
As this quote suggests, this is not only the place where Gaddis’s analysis starts but also where it ends,
even though he claims otherwise. In focusing on the two leaders, Gaddis renders the ﬁndings about
the limits of leaders’ controls about the weapons, the possibility of pre-delegation of use as well as
accidental explosions due to the limits of safety, invisible. By emphasising calculable risks and
probabilities, he cannot account for unquantiﬁable pathways to disaster, also called possibilities. Lee
Clarke perfectly identiﬁed the problem when he wrote: ‘We need to think in terms of chances and
odds and likelihoods. But we shouldn’t concentrate so much on probabilities that we forget the
possibilities.’49
A similar reduction of the unquantiﬁable/unknowable to the impossible as a result of an approach in
terms of risk assessment can be found in Vincent Touze’s otherwise remarkable study of the Crisis.
Commenting on Sagan’s scenarios for potential accidents, he confesses: ‘it is true that the develop-
ments are very technical and one is not able to forge an opinion’.50 As a result, he neglects them
entirely as inconsequential. Instead of suspending judgement or acknowledging the limits of what
can be known, he even goes so far as to treat possible accidents as only having a conﬁrming effect on
previously observed trends: ‘all the incidents would only have had one single … effect anyway: to
conﬁrm US resolve and lead the USSR to give up.’51 The game-theoretic literature on brinkmanship
based on risk thinking that has taken the Crisis as a textbook case is a typical example of this
inability to grasp the unbearable lightness of luck; it also treats the unquantiﬁable as impossible and
therefore negligible.52 This intellectual move illustrates that, as Mary Douglas aptly wrote, ‘risk is
not a thing, it’s a way of thinking’.53 Most important, this way of thinking is oriented towards a
desire for control and faith in that control.54 This implication of risk thinking is most obvious in a
research memorandum for RAND, published in 1960 in which the founding father of risk-based
nuclear strategy, Thomas Schelling, writes about ‘a controlled loss of control’.55 As I have argued
elsewhere, Schelling’s legacy of conﬂating uncertainty and risk in Strategy of Conﬂict has produced
the illusion that risk thinking was able to capture uncertainty and luck. The effect of this illusion has
been unduly to reassert control.
48 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
pp. 269–70, emphasis added.
49 Lee Clarke, Worst Cases (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 41.
50 Touze, Missiles et décisions, p. 631, my translation.
51 Ibid., p. 639, my translation. Like Gaddis, he ends up focusing on leaders only. In his case, Kennedy only
(p. 639).
52 See, for example, Robert Dodge, Schelling’s Game Theory: How to Make Decisions (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), ch. 12; Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley,Games of Strategy (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2015), ch. 14.
53 Mary Douglas, ‘Risk and danger’, in Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London:
Routledge, 1994 [orig. pub. 1992]), p. 44.
54 Esther Eidinow, Luck, Fate and Fortune: Antiquity and its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 158.
55 Thomas Schelling, ‘The Role of Theory in the Study of Conﬂict’, RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2515-
PR (13 January 1960), p. 28, cited in Marc Trachtenberg, ‘Strategic thinking in America 1952–1966’, Political
Science Quarterly, 104:2 (1989), p. 311.
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Such epistemic inconsistency is frequently displayed in the limited literature in French on the subject.
In most other cases, the role of luck is acknowledged in theory but its implications and the questions
it would raise are immediately denied at the same time, via its reincorporation in a narrative of
control. For instance, Marie-Hélène Labbé, who writes that ‘for a week, the world came close
to apocalypse’56 in her two-page treatment of the Crisis, notes that ‘later revelations nuanced
the idealized image of a perfectly managed crisis’ and recognises the pressure Castro put on
Khrushchev to be more aggressive towards the US. However, she ends up underplaying the role of
luck in the outcome of the Crisis: the ‘risk [of use of nuclear weapons] … was omnipresent but
controlled during the Cold War’.57 Similarly, the 2014 Livre noir du nucléaire militaire accepts that
the 1962 crisis is the closest humanity came to nuclear war and that it could have been triggered
without political approval, but concludes by looking at the controllable side of the problem,
suggesting that the two leaders should have learned from it that small nuclear arsenals are enough to
deter.58 This conclusion obviously ignores the episodes mentioned above in which the peaceful
outcome of the Crisis is not reducible to a success of deterrence, notably because it resulted from a
decision taken out of false information or because the exact cause of the behaviour is not well
established.
Beyond the epistemic inconsistency, scholarship can escape the unbearable lightness of luck without
actually refuting it by a form of practical inconsistency. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s 1999
revised edition of the classic but highly criticised Essence of Decision exempliﬁes this tendency. They
ostensibly accept normal accident theory, that is, the idea that tightly coupled and interactively
complex systems like nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to accidents, yet they conclude with a
recommendation in terms of manageability which is at odds with the theory or would at best assume
that another disaster will happen before the nuclear one, which would make it less
signiﬁcant.59 They conclude that ‘the potential for dysfunctionality exists and must be managed’,60
when the key insight of normal accident theory is that systemic accidents in complex and tightly
coupled systems cannot be managed away. This is clear in Scott Sagan’s summary in 2004: ‘scholars
in the “normal accidents theory” school have argued that organizations that exhibit both high
degrees of interactive complexity and tightly coupled operations will suffer serious accidents despite
their efforts to maintain high reliability and safety.’61
Former member of the latest two commissions on the French Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité
nationale (white book on defense and national security) Bruno Tertrais displays a similar form of
56 Marie Hélène Labbé, Le Risque Nucléaire (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), p. 21, my translation.
57 Ibid., pp. 21, 34, emphasis added. Labbé mentions the risk of accidental nuclear war, but only in relation to
India and Pakistan (p. 23) and states that ‘nuclear proliferation is the primary cause of [nuclear risk]’ (p. 13).
58 Jacques Villain, Le livre noir du nucléaire militaire (Paris: Fayard, 2014), pp. 96–7, 201. The exact same lesson
was emphasised three decades earlier and before the discoveries about limits of safety and control during the
Crisis in L’aventure de la bombe, De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire, proceedings of a conference of the
Foundation Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1985), p. 185. An exception is Georges-Henri Soutou in his public
lecture at the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques (6 June 2011), available at: {http://www.asmp.fr/
travaux/communications/2011_06_06_soutou.htm} accessed 16 May 2016.
59 This latter point is developed in Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons scholarship’.
60 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn
(New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 159–60, p. 160.
61 Scott Sagan, ‘The problem of redundancy problem: Why more nuclear security forces may produce less nuclear
security’, Risk Analysis, 24:4 (2004), p. 937; Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Leaving with High Risk
Technologies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 304.
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practical inconsistency. Nuclear crises have to remain manageable, so he starts his short analysis of
the risk of nuclear escalation in history by deliberately setting aside the case of the Crisis. He can
therefore conclude that: ‘there does not seem to be any example when nuclear weapons have been
really “close” to being employed’.62 A similarly inconsistent reluctance to acknowledge the role of
luck is observable in the writings of the late French nuclear strategist and policy adviser Thérèse
Delpech. Given that she recognises Cuba as ‘the most dangerous nuclear crisis so far’ and accepts the
widest variety of dangers, it is very revealing that she ends up hedging her acknowledgement of the
role of luck in the outcome of the Crisis. She accepts that: ‘during the second peak [of the Crisis, on
27 October], a nuclear war was almost launched on more than one occasion’63 and recognises that
escalation was possible during the blockade.64 She also recognises the lack of information and
existence of misperceptions on both sides, and acknowledges that the short-range atomic weapons in
Cuba could have been ﬁred.65 Finally, she agrees with the highest assessment of the risk of nuclear
retaliation and writes that: ‘if those weapons had been ﬁred at U.S. troops, the United States would
have retaliated with nuclear weapons’.66 Building on Nikolai Leonov’s testimony mentioned above,
she concludes, reluctantly and with a caveat that: ‘Luck may have played a part as well.’67 This is a
foregone conclusion: for practical purposes, nuclear crises have to be managed, so they have to be
manageable even if this conclusion depends on an inconsistent double operation of obfuscating the
role of luck without being able to disprove it.68
Reasserting control by rejecting counterfactual thinking
In this section, I focus on rejection of counterfactual thinking as an epistemological hurdle that has
led French scholarship away from a full acknowledgement of the danger of the Crisis. This rejection
of counterfactual thinking seems to be a disciplinary limitation of diplomatic history, which has had
a particularly strong inﬂuence on scholars of the Crisis in France.
A recent debate in Security Studies between a diplomatic historian and his political scientist colleague
illustrates the reluctance of diplomatic historians vis-à-vis counterfactual thinking. Frank Gavin,
62 Bruno Tertrais, ‘In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear
Weapons’ (Paris: IFRI, Proliferation Papers, 2011), p. 27. He considers the risk of escalation as coming from
the Soviet Union only: that avoids the episode of the US F-102s described above as well as the limits of safety
and of command and control on the US side during the Crisis. This is interesting given that the most complete
study in French makes the exact opposite assumption. Vincent Touze writes that: ‘any American attack would
have led to Soviet retaliations’ and as a result focuses on Kennedy’s decisions. (Touze, Missiles et décisions
pp. 639, my translation.)
63 Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the Twenty First Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era
of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2012), p. 57. This study has been translated into
French and published by Odile Jacob in 2013.
64 Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the Twenty First Century, p. 69.
65 Ibid. She had written about those issues in a previous essay: Savage Century: Back to Barbarism (New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 171–2.
66 Ibid., p. 69.
67 Ibid., p. 10. Exceptions which fully recognise the features identiﬁed in the ﬁrst section of this essay are Georges
Le Guelte, Histoire de la menace nucléaire (Paris: Hatier, 1997), pp. 52–3 and Georges Le Guelte, Les armes
nucléaires, mythes et réalités (Arles: Actes Sud, 2009), pp. 131–4.
68 Somehow even General Lucien Poirier falls for the practical inconsistency. In his ‘elements pour une théorie de
la crise’, he fully acknowledges contingency and improvisations in crisis management, warns against the
dangers of systematisation and notes how issues of accidents are left aside but ends up inviting continuous
progress towards a ‘science’ that has to be possible. Lucien Poirier, Essais de strategie theorique (Paris: Les Sept
Epees, 1982), pp. 370, 372, 374.
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a trained diplomatic historian turned security studies scholar, exposes a frequent concern among
diplomatic historians: ‘No matter how plausible, “what-ifs” are not part of our mission. This has led
some historians to take a rather dim view of counterfactual exercises, believing they do violence to
the craft of historical reconstruction.’69 His scepticism appears clearly in his persisting sense that a
historical argument without counterfactuals is possible and that some of the historians’ critiques of
counterfactual analysis remain valid. He writes: ‘It is close to impossible to develop theories or
frameworks for understanding a complex world without imagining alternative causal paths, shifting
variables, and different outcomes.’70 He concludes: “these essays convincingly remove many of the
arguments a historian might make about dismissing counterfactual analysis entirely’.71 So even the
moderate diplomatic historian ‘is not without scepticism’ vis-à-vis the use of counterfactual reasoning
in a US context where it is more accepted than in France. This hostility is one of the reasons why
French analysts, strongly inﬂuenced by the tradition of diplomatic history, do not adequately engage
with the dangers of the Crisis. As Ned Lebow notes, the rejection of counterfactual thinking leads
analysts to a historical teleology that retrospectively neglects the role of luck and the validity of other
possible worlds that come with it. ‘If the Cuban missile crisis had led to war – conventional or nuclear –
historians would have constructed a causal chain leading ineluctably to this outcome.’72
Interestingly, in 1964 the French philosopher and strategist Pierre Hassner may have been the ﬁrst to
identify retrospective illusions of control in the few French accounts of the Crisis. He observed that
prevailing accounts treated the actual outcome of the Crisis as necessary and were unable to grasp
the Crisis itself as an event in the philosophical sense of the term. His contrast between French
accounts that assume that the Crisis has settled the matter and the American accounts focusing on
surprise, accidents, and pathways to escalation is still valid ﬁve decades later.73
The lack of legitimacy of counterfactual reasoning and the study of other possible worlds in French
IR circles is such that it is not a matter of debate.74 This can be explained by disciplinary origins. IR
in France borrowed its theoretical foundations from international law and diplomatic history, or
what the founding ﬁgure Pierre Renouvin would call histoire des relations internationales (history
of international relations) which remains based on the need for empirical and archival evidence.75
69 Francis J. Gavin, ‘What if? The historian and the counterfactual’, Security Studies, 24:3 (2015), p. 425.
70 Ibid., p. 425, emphasis added, same phrasing, p. 430.
71 Ibid., p. 430.
72 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Counterfactuals and security studies’, Security Studies, 24:3 (2015), p. 406.
73 Pierre Hassner, ‘Violence, rationalité, incertitude: des tendances iréniques et apocalytiques dans l’étude des
conﬂits internationaux’, Revue Francaise de Science Politique, 14:6 (1964), pp. 1171–8. Interestingly, one of
the other very few French exceptions to Hassner’s diagnosis is a fellow philosopher and not a diplomatic
historian: Jean-Pierre Dupuy. He displays an interesting form of conﬁdence which cannot be reduced to control
and treats the possibility of accidents as conditions of possibility of a fate that prevents disaster, but
acknowledges that this cannot last forever. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, foreword in Günther Anders, Hiroshima est
partout (Paris: Seuil, 2008), pp. 27–8 and Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Dans l’œil du cyclone (Paris: Carnet Nords,
2009), p. 313.
74 In French, the short edited volume by Florian Besson and Jan Synowiecki, Ecrire l’histoire avec des ‘si’ (Paris:
editions de l’ENS, 2015); Fabrice d’Almeida and Anthony Rowley, Et si on refaisait l’histoire (Paris: Odile
Jacob, 2011); and Quentin Deluermoz and Pierre Singarevélou, Pour une histoire des possibles: Analyses
contrefactuelles et futurs non advenus (Paris: Seuil, 2016) are exceptions.
75 Matthieu Chillaud, ‘IR in France: State and costs of a disciplinary variety’, Review of International Studies,
40:4 (2014), p. 809. In all fairness, Renouvin’s methodological intervention came out of a frustration with
diplomatic explanations for the origins of the First World War. He wanted to move beyond the ‘narrow
horizons’ of diplomatic history, from the relations between diplomats to the relations between peoples.
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Six decades later, the heir of Renouvin as Professor of the History of International Relations at the
Sorbonne wrote: ‘the historian … keeps a speciﬁcity. A part of his or her approach is empirical. …
To that effect, the work on sources, and in particular on archives, remains at the heart of his or her
craft.’76
As suggested earlier in the debate between Gavin and Lebow, such empiricism – by treating
counterfactual reasoning as an unacceptable scholarly practice – allows for a denial of the need
to study the danger of the Crisis. Quite tellingly, Renouvin’s direct successor interprets the
outcome of the Crisis as resulting from ‘tacit bargaining’ between the two actors.77 As a result,
political scientist Jean-Yves Haine revealed the general French attitude towards the missile
crisis when, in 2004, he wrote that: ‘One has difﬁculty grasping the intensity of the showdown.’78
While anglophone IR scholars have paid sustained attention to counterfactual thinking and
even established ‘what-if history’ as a subﬁeld since the 1990s, this has not at all been the case
in France.79
Even Vincent Touze, who wrote the most serious study of the Crisis available in French, ends up
failing to entertain the possibility that it might have ended differently than it actually did and quickly
dismisses attempts at considering possible outcomes as based on ‘hypotheticals’.80 He does so despite
being well aware of the existing scholarship in English reviewed above. His denial is justiﬁed on the
grounds of disciplinary boundaries and the impossibility of testing alternative outcomes; to him
counterfactual thinking is illegitimate in political science. He writes: ‘Sagan’s goal is not to contribute
to the study of foreign policy. His purpose is to contribute to accidents theory. As far as our subject is
concerned, his examples are all hypothetical.’81 Further, he continues: ‘One can very well conceive of
nuclear accidents during the crisis in the US … The effects they could have had belongs so much to
speculation that the subject does not seem legitimate.’82 If done rigorously, such ‘speculation’ is
called counterfactual thinking.
Reasserting control by remembering an idiosyncratic experience of the Crisis
exempt of fear
Contrary to the latent assumptions of a common narrative of the danger, causes and consequences of
the ‘most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age’, the French experience of the Crisis is idiosyncratically
deprived of fear, and this interpretation has been relatively stable over time. The contrast with other
nuclear-armed NATO allies and permanent members of Security Council is striking.
Pierre Renouvin, ‘Introduction générale’, in Pierre Renouvin (ed.), Histoire des relations internationales,
Volume I: Le Moyen-Age, ed. François-L. Ganshof (Paris: Hachette, 1953). The next generation blamed him
for not being entirely consistent with this agenda though.
76 Robert Frank, ‘Histoire et théorie des relations internationales’, in Robert Frank (ed.), Pour une histoire des
relations internationales (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012), p. 82, my translation.
77 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, ‘Le marchandage tacite et la solution des conﬂits’, Revue Francaise de Science
Politique, 14:4 (1964).
78 Haine, Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d’alliés, p. 203.
79 Two landmark studies would be Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds), Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and Richard Ned Lebow,
Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
80 Touze, Missiles et décisions, p. 120, my translation.
81 Ibid., p. 120, my translation.
82 Ibid., p. 629, my translation.
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Among policymakers, President Kennedy was particularly worried about inadvertent escalation and
being forced to use nuclear weapons83 and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan lost sleep over
the dangers of the Crisis; on 4 November, he assessed that ‘everything was at stake…’ in the Crisis.84
On the contrary, French President Charles De Gaulle did not voice any particular fear at the time and
the French military and intelligentsia do not seem to have felt such a threat, except in press reports for
a few days after Kennedy’s speech on 22 October.85 A biographer of de Gaulle, for instance, assumes
that ‘because no American missiles were based in France,… she would not be an early target, even if it
came to a nuclear exchange’,86 which is evidence for the ‘great calmness’ of France during the Crisis.87
Macmillan conﬁrms this impression when he writes that, faced with the threat of imminent nuclear
war, ‘the French were … contemptuous’88 while other British Cabinet ministers worried that war was
imminent. On the evening of 28 October 1962, Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone,
Lord President of the Council, whose wife had just given birth, considered whether to baptise the child
himself.89 On the contrary, Etienne Burin des Roziers, general secretary of the Elysee Palace, makes fun
of the fear of disaster in his diary, which was not meant to be made public before decades.90
In the press and the population, a high level of fear was felt for at least a week in the US and the UK. On
2 November 1962, the New Yorker could record: ‘We waited for something to happen, gauging, minute
by minute, in something like pain, our ignorance of what the next minute would bring, and feeling the
dead weight of the conviction that no one on earth – not the president, not the Russians-knew what it
would bring.’91 As Alice George summarised it, ‘for many Americans, it represented one week of
emprisonment in fear… For many Americans, the clock was ticking loudly, and like men before a ﬁring
squad, they waited and wondered whether they would feel anything before the end came.’92 The French
83 Based on the testimony of Robert S. McNamara in James G. Blight, The Shattered Cristal Ball (Rowman and
Littleﬁeld, 1991), p. 8; Haine, Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d’alliés, p. 216 and Holloway in Pelopidas, Global
Nuclear Vulnerability (under review).
84 Under 21 October, he writes: ‘Slept rather badly, which is unusual for me … After 10 pm, got a message from
President Kennedy, giving a short account of the situation wh. was developing between US and USSR, over
Cuba’. Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, Volume II: Prime Minister and after 1957–1966, ed. and
introduction Peter Catterall (Basingbroke: MacMillan, 2003), p. 508. He then opens his account of the
following day as ‘the ﬁrst day of the World Crisis!’ (p. 508) On 24 October, he continues: ‘an anxious day
[too]. For the ﬁrst clash will soon begin, if the Russian ships sail on.’ (p. 511) He continued following the
developments of the Crisis closely, writing on 28 October: ‘I am writing this in a state of exhaustion, after
being up all Friday and Saturday nights – to about 4 am. (The difference of hours in America and England is
the cause).’ p. 513.
85 Kennedy’s speech and the Crisis were on the front page of Le Figaro on 23 October 1962, for a brief analysis
only. On the 24th, the editorial in Le Monde questions the validity of American evidence, but two days later,
after Sherman Kent came to show some photographs to the journalists, another piece was published to conﬁrm
the validity of this information.
86 Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 273.
87 These words are from Ambassador Gabriel Robin. Phone interview with Gabriel Robin, 17 July 2014.
National mobilisations against the force de frappe did not take place before 1963. Sezin Topcu, ‘Atome, gloire
et désenchantement: résister à la France atomique avant 1968’, in Céline Plessis, Sezin Topcu, and Christophe
Bonneuil (eds), Une autre histoire des ‘trente glorieuses’: Modernisation, contestations et pollutions dans la
France d’après-guerre (Paris: La découverte, 2013), p. 198.
88 Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, pp. 514–15.
89 Len Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Palgrave, 1999), p. 1.
90 Etienne Burin des Roziers, Retour aux sources: 1962, l’année décisive (Paris: Plon, 1986), p. 136.
91 ‘The talk of the town’, New Yorker (3 November 1962).
92 Alice George, Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 164.
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press, relying mostly on American information, generally only insisted on the risk of war following
President Kennedy’s speech, around 24–8 October.93 Joelle Beurier’s study of the year 1962 as repre-
sented in the French popular photo-journalistic outlet Paris-Match shows that in its pages the violence of
the world was dramatised during the ﬁrst half of the year but euphemised during the second, when the
events this article engages with took place. Indeed, the only French source suggesting serious fears of
nuclear war came from the French Embassy in Washington, which expressed in a telegram deep worries
associated with not having an anti-nuclear shelter.94
A few elements of the Crisis appeared on French television: the 8 pm news programme, for example,
showed footage of the meeting between President Kennedy and Andreii Gromyko, as well as the
confrontation between Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin at the 26 October session of the UN
Security Council.95 On balance, however, none of this conveyed a signiﬁcant level of fear or
awareness of the danger in the context of the time. A study of the world news segment broadcast in
French movie theaters at the time, Regards sur le monde, suggests this absence of fear very strongly.
The Crisis does not appear until 31 October 1962 (ten days after the Kennedy speech, and more than
two weeks after the beginning of American suspicions about missiles in Cuba). This three-and-a-half-
minute segment emphasised control in the voiceover: ‘anything was possible, then the miracle of
wisdom and ﬁrmness defeated the fatality of unfolding dangers’.96 Interestingly, the order in which
news items were presented that week did not change to reﬂect a particularly grave danger: the sport
section followed, as usual.
Similarly, the main outlet on military issues in France, the Revue de Défense Nationale, carried a few
columns worrying about the increasing arms trade between Cuba and the Soviet Union, but prior to
1963 it published nothing in particular on the Crisis itself. This is all the more surprising as two
articles published earlier in 1962 in this same journal discuss the risk of inadvertent escalation.97
93 Joelle Beurier, ‘Passions françaises et culture de Guerre froide’, in Philippe Buton, Olivier Buttner, and Michel
Hastings (eds), La guerre froide vue d’en bas (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2014), pp. 213–36. The Crisis beneﬁts
from a longer article than other events including a few titles mentioning the possibility of a war but she notes
that the lexicon as well as the iconography are downplaying the danger.
94 Maurice Vaïsse, foreword in Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la crise des missiles de Cuba, p. 9. This is evidence that
for the French at the time, this is an Americano-Soviet crisis and that they are not involved in it. Maurice
Vaïsse, ‘Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps’, in Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la crise des missiles de Cuba, p. 89;
interview with Maurice Vaïsse, Paris, 27 August 2013. French domestic politics at the time were intense focal
points, which easily distracted from considering the Crisis: Algeria, which had been a French department since
1830, had become independent a few months before, on 18 March 1962 and, on 28 October, in the middle of
the Crisis, a referendum took place, deciding that for the ﬁrst time the French President will be elected directly
by the citizens. A failure to win this referendum would have meant the end of the Presidency of Charles de
Gaulle, after four years in power under a new Constitution and only a few months after he survived an
assassination attempt. As a consequence, the speech of US Secretary of Defense McNamara on the shift to
ﬂexible response has more impact on the French conversation than the Crisis. This mostly reﬂects a fear of
conventional war in Europe and a fear centered on Berlin.
95 Available at: {http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF97049141/rencontre-gromyko-kennedy-video.html}; {http://www.
ina.fr/video/CAF97027208/conseil-de-securite-video.html}; {http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF97027010/depart-u-
thant-pour-la-havane-video.html}; accessed 7 December 2016.
96 Available at: {http://www.ina.fr/video/AFE86003852} accessed 16 May 2016, my translation.
97 Claude Delmas, ‘Reﬂexions sur la guerre’, writes that: ‘the strategy of deterrence includes risks, because of the
possibilities of misunderstandings, of the obsessive fear of surprise attack (an atomic “Pearl Harbour”) and
mutual difﬁculties of appreciation of intentions; ﬁnally deterrence is hard to stabilize due to the arms race
(more qualitative than quantitative).’ See Revue de Defense Nationale (July 1962), p. 1186, my translation. In
the same journal, Colonel de Saint Germain wrote: ‘the nuclear phase can only be an accident, or a series of
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Prominent French strategist General Pierre-Marie Gallois was already convinced at the time that the
situation was safe due to information he received from his contacts in NATO, who conﬁrmed that
the NATO military did not feel ‘on the brink’.98 Pierre Hassner, then a close collaborator of major
French strategist Raymond Aron, emphasised the contrast between the French indifference and the
British alarm and anticipation of the end of the world.99
While many French intellectuals, in particular Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, had taken an early
stance on nuclear weapons after Hiroshima, the French intelligentsia was conspicuously silent during the
Crisis.100 Of course, one needs to keep in mind that Camus passed away before the Crisis, in January
1960. But Sartre, André Malraux, Simone de Beauvoir, and prominent Catholic intellectual Francois
Mauriac seem to have been completely silent about the Crisis.101 None of the journals published by the
French intellectual elite in the fall of 1962 touched upon the problem of the Crisis: there is no mention of
it in Les temps modernes, Esprit, or La revue des deux mondes.102 The only signiﬁcant discussion
appeared in L’Humanité, the daily newspaper of the French Communist Party, in which Sartre and
Aragon published a message of support to the Cuban people in the name of association France-Cuba on
25 October. But this statement made no mention of the nuclear threat.103
Given the intimate connection with Charles de Gaulle cultivated by a part of the French population,
which wrote to the president to share their hopes and fears, it is also quite telling that a search
accidents, to be avoided all the more as they are more serious, more deﬁnitive. … Our army keeps the
possibility of accident in its forecasts, in its equipment, in its behaviour.’ Later, he writes about ‘the fragility
and precariousness [that nuclear weapons’] existence give the world, placed by them at the mercy of a
miscalculation among many other imponderable factors.’ See Revue de Défense Nationale, 205 (August/
September 1962), pp. 1352, 1355, my translation. Jacques Vernant wrote about it brieﬂy in 1963 as a game:
Jacques Vernant, Le jeu diplomatique à l’âge nucléaire (1963), pp. 862–8.
98 Christian Malis, Pierre Marie Gallois: Geopolitique, Histoire, Strategie, Lausanne: L’Age d’homme (2009).
99 Interview with Pierre Hassner, Paris, 9 December 2013.
100 For Camus: his op-ed in Combat (8 August 1945); Simone Debout, ‘Sartre et Camus face à Hiroshima’,
Esprit, 239:1 (1998); Annie Kramer, ‘A l’aube de l’âge atomique “entre l’enfer et la raison”’, CISAC Honors
thesis (Stanford University, 2013).
101 There is not one word about it in the essential Dictionnaire André Malraux edited by Charles-Louis Foulon,
Jeanine Mossuz-Lavau, and Michael de Saint-Cheron (Paris: CNRS editions, 2011). The volume of published
letters by Simone de Beauvoir that covers the years 1940–63 does not include any letter for the year 1962.
Simone de Beauvoir, Lettres à Sartre, Volume II: 1940–1963 (Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1990). Her biographers
Claude Francis and Fernande Gontier mention her visits to Havana with Sartre and comment on her
impressions on Castro but do not make any mention of the missile crisis. Claude Francis and Fernande
Gontier, Simone de Beauvoir (Paris: Perrin, 2006 [orig. pub. 1985]), pp. 300–12 and 321–2. Mauriac’s Bloc
note for the year 1962 does not mention the Crisis. His correspondence with fellow writer Jean Paulhan at the
time interestingly mentions the OAS – Organisation of the Secret Army or Secret Armed Organization, an
armed group opposed to the independence of Algeria – but not the Crisis, in the middle of a theological
conversation, suggesting the primacy of domestic politics in French intellectual life at the time. François
Mauriac, D’un bloc-notes à l’autre: 1952–1969 (Paris: Bartillat, 2004) and François Mauriac and Jean
Paulhan, Correspondance 1925–1967 (Bassac: éditions Claire Paulhan, 2001), p. 345.
102 For ‘Les temps modernes’, I do not include October of course since there was a double issue. In ‘Esprit’, there
is an article by Stanley Hoffmann about the Franco-American relationship but it is about the post-Second
World War period.
103 Nicolas Badalassi, Pour Quelques Missiles de Plus (Sarrebruck: éditions européennes, 2011), p. 140. The only
writing by Sartre I found that related to issues of nuclear security was also published a year before the Crisis,
at the time of the Bay of Pigs. L’express (20 April 1961), p. 8, quoted in Denis Bertholet, Sartre (Paris: Plon,
2000), p. 434. See also pp. 421–4, 430.
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through the correspondence received by the Presidency of the French Republic in October 1962 from
private citizens, mayors of French cities, and French clergymen does not reveal a single letter
expressing fear or asking for clariﬁcation regarding the nuclear situation in Cuba.104 Similarly, none
of the cards of best wishes for the year 1963 which have been kept mentioned the favourable
conclusion of a very risky and scary crisis.105 In short, an in-depth study of French sources suggests
that the French experience of the Crisis ignored the risk of nuclear war or nuclear weapons accidents
and did not display the level of fear expected by security studies scholars who deduce a deterrent
effect from the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.
This absence of fear persists in more recent statements by the few French public ﬁgures who have
expressed an interpretation of the Crisis. In 2014, Ambassador Gabriel Robin, a French ofﬁcial
working in the French delegation to the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels
during the crisis, remembered words of danger but no experience of it: ‘We had the feeling to be on
the verge, possibly, of a nuclear danger.’ However, he continued by saying that this was ‘not his
business’ since he was in charge of economic relations and it did not disturb his daily work.
He concluded: ‘We were saying “this is frightening” but we did not really think about it.’ He
similarly remembered that Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville came to visit
during the Crisis and that he ‘was not distraught at all’.106 This is consistent with the telegram
Couve sent to all the representatives of France abroad on 18 September 1962, a month before the
tensions rose, in which he wrote: ‘even if the idea is constantly suggested, nowhere is it said
expressly that were the USA to intervene in Cuba, the Soviet Union would retaliate by triggering a
nuclear war.”107
The same feeling of indifference and lack of awareness of the danger appears in the two chapters on
France and NATO in the 1993 French volume on L’Europe et la crise de Cuba (Europe and the
Cuban Crisis) edited by diplomatic historian Maurice Vaïsse. Pierre Gallois writes about ‘American
hysteria’108 adding that ‘except for paciﬁst movements, public opinion worried only moderately’.109
‘While housewives hoarded, governments only manifested a limited apprehension.’110 Future Pre-
sident Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who as a then 36-year-old ﬁnance minister used to meet with
General de Gaulle at least once or twice a week – or so he says in an interview in 2000 – goes so far
104 On the intimate connection through the correspondence between De Gaulle and the French public, and how hopes
and fears are the core of it, see Sudhir Hazareesingh, Le mythe gaullien (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), p. 119.
105 Archives of the Presidency of the French Republic, Peyreﬁtte sur Seine, France, 5AG1/1322-1358. Of course, the
sample I was able to consult was not complete. However, the presence of aggressive letters to De Gaulle blaming
him for the outcome of the Algerian war suggests that no purposeful sanitation has taken place.
Moreover, the presence of correspondence with private citizens and with the mayors of France which did not call
for or receive an answer suggests that expressions of fears would not have been removed simply because no one
replied to them. In any case, the kind of letter I was looking for would not have been either particularly offensive or
easy to single out. Sudhir Hazareesingh had already noted that major events like May 1968 had generated a
surprisingly small amount of correspondence from the French population. Hazareesingh, Le mythe gaullien,
p. 119. Therefore, the silence of the available correspondence can plausibly conﬁrm my argument.
106 Interview with Robin (2014).
107 Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques francais, Documents diplomatiques francais 1962
tome 2, 1er juillet–31 decembre (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1999), p. 222.
108 Pierre Marie Gallois, ‘Les conséquences de la crise de Cuba sur l’alliance’, in Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la crise
des missiles de Cuba, p. 172.
109 Ibid., p. 171, my translation.
110 Ibid., p. 171, my translation.
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as to say that it was a time of ‘insouciance’ and ‘the happiest moment in his career’.111 Apparently,
then, he had no memory of any experience of existential fear.
Most interestingly for the argument of this article, no major French intellectual, scholar or
strategist has changed his mind concerning the meaning of the Crisis over the following ﬁfty years in
spite of the compelling discoveries that have been made: the presence of nuclear weapons
in Cuba that was ignored by the Kennedy administration, the debate about whether the Cubans had
the authority to ﬁre them, the close calls revealed by the oral history conferences of the 1980s and
1990s, Sagan in 1993 and Dobbs in 2008. Gabriel Robin offered a revisionist interpretation of the
causes of the Crisis and its resolution but his book was ignored by scholars as well as
policymakers.112
Raymond Aron did not live to see the major revelations of the 1990s, but he lent his
authority to a persisting narrative of control and underestimation of the danger of the Crisis.113 In
1976, he wrote that: ‘the most spectacular episode of the Cold War, the direct showdown of two
nuclear-weapons powers … excludes by no means an interpretation consistent with the concepts of
classical diplomacy.’114 In a 1980 television interview with Dominique Wolton and Jean-Louis
Missika, Aron considered that: ‘Even the Cuban crisis of 1962 was not truly a nuclear
emergency.’115
For most of his life, General Gallois – Aron’s intellectual adversary in the so-called ‘Great
Debate’ over French nuclear strategy in the early 1960s – did not think the Crisis worth writing
about. For him, the evolution and outcome of the Crisis were just additional evidence that
nuclear weapons created a shared rationality – even when dealing with enemies like the Soviet Union.
Gallois felt that the Crisis was not threatening because its progressive evolution led to the ofﬁcial
alerting of strategic nuclear forces that in turn forced the two great powers to negotiate. ‘Surprise
was impossible.’116 This has been a consistent interpretation over the years on the part of Gallois,
who never considered the Crisis to be a ‘nuclear crisis’.117 This is the case even if his archives show
111 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Mémoire vivante: Entretien avec Agathe Fourniaud (Paris: Flammarion, 2001),
pp. 100, 111, my translation.
112 The limited literature in French on the topic quotes it but does not engage with the argument. Gabriel Robin
told the author that the ideas of his book were either ignored or quickly disregarded among his colleagues in
the French foreign service. Interview with Robin (2014).
113 Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘Raymond Aron et la crise de Cuba’, in Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la crise des missiles
de Cuba, who notes that Aron only changed his mind about theater nuclear weapons in Europe because of the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
114 Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre: Clausewitz, Volume II: l’âge nucléaire (Paris, Gallimard, 1976), p. 147, my
translation. Also p. 146.
115 Raymond Aron, Thinking Politically, trans. James and Marie McIntosh (London: Transaction Publishers,
1997), p. 184. In his memoirs, he treats the Crisis with no more than the reproduction of a paragraph of a
letter he received from Carl Schmitt congratulating him for his analysis. Raymond Aron, Mémoires (Paris:
Julliard, 1983), p. 456. This section does not appear in the English translation of Aron’s memoirs by George
Holoch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990).
116 Pierre-Marie Gallois, ‘A quoi sert la stratégie? Entretien avec Alain-Gérard Slama à propos du livre d’Edward
Luttwak Le Paradoxe de la stratégie’, Le Figaro (30 March 1989), p. 35, my translation.
117 Pierre Marie Gallois, ‘Risques d’escalade au niveau nucleaire’, Revue defense nationale (November 1980,
pp. 61–70; Malis, Pierre Marie Gallois, p. 471; correspondence with army general Claude Le Borgne,
14 December 2013. Based on the memories of his son, Gallois never seems to have mentioned the Cuban
Benoît Pelopidas
258
that he had been exposed to literature about accidental use of nuclear weapons and inadvertent
nuclear war.118
A third essential French nuclear strategist, André Beaufre, gave a revealing interview in 1971,
in which he explicitly treats nuclear war as impossible because nuclear dynamics are perfectly
predictable and controllable. When asked whether he believed in the risk of a total nuclear war, he
responded:
at the nuclear level, we are able to … exactly calculate what the war will look like. We were
not able to do so with much smaller means such as the pistol, the machine gun, or even the
canon. Errors and dreams were allowed. Today, this [sic] is no longer possible. We are
working with something which is inﬁnitely calculable and we know ahead of time what the
results will be. Men, because they are not crazy, will not do certain things. … Therefore, I do
not believe in the great catastrophe nor in atomic death.119
Surprisingly, and very tellingly for the argument of this article, this opinion is shared by a longtime
opponent of nuclear weapons, General Claude Le Borgne, who described the Crisis as ‘sort of a
psychodrama that the two great heads of state, then nuclear beginners, played for their own
education’,120 adding that ‘the fact that public opinion saw the world on the brink of war is another
matter, a moot point’.121 In a way, this startling absence of fear during the Crisis has led both the
conservative proponents of rational deterrence theory and radical anti-colonialists on the left to
embrace a narrative based on the retrospective illusion of safety and control.122
Even the ofﬁcial directives from the French Ministry of Education regarding the teaching of this
episode in middle and high school perpetuate this retrospective illusion of control compatible with an
experience of the event devoid of fear.123 Teaching the Crisis is no longer mentioned in the ofﬁcial
guidelines the years for which school is still mandatory. It has disappeared from the guidelines for
ages 11 to 15 since 2013 and the Crisis does not appear in the list of 43 landmark dates from the
third millennium BC to today that French students have to master at the end of mandatory
schooling.124 For the rest of high school, the recommendations suggest that the Crisis allows the
missile crisis in conversations with his family. This might have happened had he thought there was a serious
risk of nuclear war. Interview with Philippe Gallois, 13 March 2013.
118 In the documentation he kept, one ﬁnds an article from Le Monde of 20 February 1960 with an insert on p. 2,
with the title ‘Eviter une guerre declenchée par erreur de calcul’. Archives of Pierre-Marie Gallois, 30Z 37602/1,
Services Historiques de la Défense, Vincennes. I regard it as telling that Gallois chose to cut it out of a newspaper
and kept it in his records.
119 Jean Offredo. ‘Interview with André Beaufre and Gilles Martinet, “La guerre atomique est-elle possible?”’, in
Jean Offredo (ed.), Le sens du futur (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1971), p. 110, my translation.
120 Early on, strategist Alain Joxe made the same point in his 1964 essay, ‘La crise de Cuba’.
121 Correspondence with Army General Claude Le Borgne, 14 December 2013.
122 See, for example, an op-ed entitled ‘La crise cubaine’ from the March–May 1963 issue of Socialisme ou
Barbarie, pp. 80–2.
123 One exception would be a textbook reviewed by Gabriel Robin in 1984, which argued that: ‘the crisis seems
to bring the world on the brink of World War III’. Quoted in Robin, La crise de Cuba, p. 10, my translation.
124 ‘Conseil supérieur des programmes, projets de programmes pour les cycles’, 2–4 September 2015, p. 301,
available at: {http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/ﬁle/09_-_septembre/22/9/programmes_cycles_2_3_4_
469229.pdf} accessed 16 May 2016 ; ‘Bulletin Ofﬁciel 42’ (November 2013), available at: {http://cache.
media.education.gouv.fr/ﬁle/42/56/7/4776_annexe1_280567.pdf} accessed 16 May 2016, pp. 7–8. Interest-
ingly, nuclear history does not appear at all.
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teacher to: ‘insist … on the weight of deterrence and on the will of the players to avoid a direct
confrontation’.125
Overall, a study of the French experience of the Crisis and discourse about it among scholars,
military ofﬁcers and education ofﬁcials shows an absence of fear that has been translated over time
into a narrative of control. This relative fearlessness contrasts both with implicit assumptions in
policy circles of a common understanding of the Crisis and with security studies scholars’ conviction
in the dread induced by the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuclear weapons is crucial for
historical accuracy, for nuclear learning, and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy
debate that would include strategic, ethical, and political concerns.
This awareness is all the more important as overconﬁdence has been shown to be a cause of
increased danger. Therefore, learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given that, over
the last thirty years, analysts have discovered and conﬁrmed that it was one of the most dangerous
events in the history of the nuclear age, the peaceful outcome of which was partly due to luck, and
that in the preceding three decades they had been overconﬁdent in the ability of good management
to explain its peaceful outcome. In order to understand the construction of such overconﬁdence,
I have accepted the idea that learning occurred mostly at the national level and focused on the
French case, in comparative perspective. I have ﬁrst shown how those scholarly ﬁndings have not
been adequately refuted and argued that those who do not take these elements seriously have done
so via epistemological or practical inconsistencies. The rejection of counterfactual thinking as a
legitimate scholarly practice is another way of rendering these ﬁndings invisible without having
to refute them. Finally, I have used the French example to show that an experience and ofﬁcial
memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does over time fuel overconﬁdence in the safety,
controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises. American and British elites and populations did
not grasp the full extent of the dangers at the time but, unlike the French, they certainly experienced
fear. These ideational and disciplinary factors would be sufﬁcient to prevent the problem from
emerging as an issue of public concern in France; they also call for responsible nuclear scholarship to
address them without waiting for structural or policy change. This opens up three avenues for
research.
First, social scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to the
grave. Following from the efforts of cognitive psychologists to uncover our tendencies to deny luck
retrospectively, further exploration of the politics of luck and how the distinction between risk and
uncertainty (as uncontrollability and unknowability even of the boundaries of the possible) has been
blurred would be a ﬁrst critical step towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability, a
reconceptualisation that would place luck at the heart of political and ethical action, power and
responsibility over time.126 At the empirical level, this approach would involve treating the question
125 Resources for teachers at technological and general high school, classes of 1ere (11th grade), available at:
{http://cache.media.eduscol.education.fr/ﬁle/lycee/70/4/LyceeGT_Ressources_Hist_1_05_GuerreFrConﬂictualites_
184704.pdf} my translation. The exact same instructions were there in 2010 and can be found for series L and
ES in 2015. Thanks to Yannick Pincé for pointing me to those documents.
126 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, part III; Porter, ‘Taking uncertainty seriously’; Brian Rathbun, ‘Uncertain
about uncertainty: Understanding the multiple meanings of a crucial concept in International Relations theory’,
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of ‘how close did we come to nuclear disaster’ as a starting point, and focusing on pathways towards
disasters rather than patterns identiﬁed in the past and expected to bind possible futures.
Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requaliﬁed as events worth investigating.127 Diplomatic
historians and security studies scholars could fruitfully join forces independently of their views on the
value of counterfactuals. Indeed, we need further investigations into the history of nuclear-armed states
both to unearth primary documentation about the past security and safety record of nuclear arsenals and
to allow for rigorous counterfactual thinking, going beyond risk thinking.128 Comparative critical oral
histories of nuclear close calls would likewise help recover the limits of control over nuclear weapons as a
legitimate object of scholarly interest. Such an approach would also tackle directly the scholarly problem
of uncritical reliance on accounts from former ofﬁcials, while at the same time addressing the policy
problems that result from misguided assumptions of a shared experience and interpretation of events like
the Crisis.129 The empirical dimension of this article is only a ﬁrst step in this direction.130 This research
programme allows analysts to start working against overconﬁdence without waiting for structural or
institutional reforms and suggests that they have a responsibility to do so.
Third, in security studies, it is crucial to reassert the socially and historically constructed process of
valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the widespread assumption that the destructive
capability of nuclear weapons triggers adequate fear, which in turn initiates a learning process that is
sufﬁcient for existential deterrence to work everywhere. If the relevant French decision-makers were
indeed adequately afraid at the time but did not leave any evidence of it, the contentions of this article
would remain valid: that absence of evidence would only be additional evidence of the scholarly
blinders entailed by a rejection of counterfactual thinking; in any case, and whatever the unspoken
thoughts of decision-makers at the time, their public display of fearlessness would be consequential for
future generations of leaders. Evidence of private doubts on the part of statesmen would only bring to
the fore the need to reconnect nuclear weapons scholarship with democratic theorising and the issue of
citizens’ right to know. Identifying the effects of rejecting counterfactual thinking and documenting the
diverse experiences and memorialisations of nuclear danger as components of a process of valuation of
nuclear weapons are ways to understand and counter overconﬁdence in their controllability. This is
International Studies Quarterly, 51 (2007); Pelopidas, ‘We all lost the Cuban Missile Crisis’ and ‘The book that
leaves nothing to chance’; Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons scholarship’; Katzenstein’s notion of protean power as
opposed to control power is already doing this with regard to the concept of power, as a result of his efforts at
tracing the blurring of uncertainty and risk; see Peter Katzenstein and Stephen Nelson, ‘Uncertainty, risk, and the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008’, International Organization, 68:2 (2014). For an early formulation of protean power, see
Katzenstein’s ‘Civilizations, Anglo-America and Balances of Practice and Power’, available at: {http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/38386/MWP_LS_2016_01.pdf?sequence=1}.
127 Early attempts would be Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, and Sasan Aghlani, Too Close
for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy (London: Chatham House, 2014) and
Gordon Barrass, ‘Able Archer 83: What were the Soviets thinking?’, Survival, 58:6 (2016).
128 This is all the more important as Article 17/L.213-2.II of the law 2008-696 about archives passed on 15 July 2008
constraints communication of archives related to nuclear history. It is available at: {https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
afﬁchTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=025DCB092EAA198A6EA37986D4516BC0.tpdila10v_3?idArticle=JORFARTI
000019198568&cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019198529&dateTexte=29990101&categorieLien=id} accessed
27May 2016. On this, see Maurice Vaïsse, ‘L’historiographie francaise relative au nucleaire’, Revue historique des
armees, 262 (2011), pp. 3–8.
129 On the self-serving dimensions of the memories of all Excomm members, see Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis
in American Memory.
130 See Pelopidas, ‘Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis, with Humility’, European Leadership Network,
11 November 2014 and Pelopidas, Global Nuclear Vulnerability (under review).
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crucial for policy-relevant learning because the coexistence of this diversity of memories with the
retrospective illusions of unanimity and control gives an unsettling resonance to Peter Sloterdijk’s
claim: ‘the only catastrophe that seems clear to all is the catastrophe which no one survives’.131
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